timelets

3. All relations of thought in judgements are those (a) of the predicate to the subject; (b) of the principle to its consequence; (c) of the divided cognition and all the members of the division to each other.”

Immanuel Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason.

Secondly, there is truth in respect of the deductions from it. The more true deductions we have from a given conception, the more criteria of its objective reality. This we might call the qualitative plurality of characteristic marks, which belong to a conception as to a common foundation, but are not cogitated as a quantity in it.

--- Immanuel Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason.

By the word 
             synthesis, 
in its most general 
                     signification, 
I understand 
      the process 
                of joining different 
representations to each other
                and of comprehending 
their diversity 
                  in one cognition.

But the synthesis 
                of a diversity 
(be it given a priori or empirically) 

is the first requisite 
                  for the production 
                                of a cognition, 
which in its beginning, 
indeed, 
                   may be crude and confused, 
and therefore in need 
                       of analysis — 

still, synthesis is 
          that by which 
                               alone 
the elements of our 
               cognitions 
                    are collected and united 
into a certain content, 

consequently 
it is the first thing 
                     on which we must 
fix our attention, 
                    if we wish to investigate 
the origin 
                           of our knowledge.

“Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher, and yet the most rarely found. The ancient Greek schools give us more examples of it than we find in our syncretistic age, in which a certain shallow and dishonest system of compromise of contradictory principles is devised, because it commends itself better to a public which is content to know something of everything and nothing thoroughly, so as to please every party.”

--- Emmanuel Kant, “The Critique of Practical Reason.”

...the common 
      fate of human 
                   reason 
in speculation, 
            to finish 
                   the imposing 
edifice of thought 
          as rapidly 
                   as possible, 
and then for 
                the first time 
to begin to 
      examine whether 
                the foundation 
is a solid one 
                 or no. 
Arrived at this point, 
                all sorts of 
excuses 
         are sought after, 
in order to 
         console us 
                    for its want 
of stability, or 
         rather, indeed, 
                      to enable us 
to dispense altogether 
                  with so late 

and dangerous an investigation.

The usual test, 
           whether 
                that which 
any one maintains 
        is merely his 
                    persuasion, 
or his subjective 
              conviction at least, 
      that is, 
                his firm belief, 
is a bet. 

It frequently happens 
                 that a man delivers 
his opinions with 
             so much boldness 
                        and assurance, 
that he appears to be 
                  under no apprehension 
as to the possibility of 
                    his being 
                            in error. 

The offer of a bet 
                 startles him, 
and makes him 
           pause. Sometimes 
                       it turns out that 
his persuasion 
         may be valued
                     at a ducat,         
but not at ten.
 
For he does not hesitate, 
                     perhaps, 
to venture a ducat, 
                but if it is proposed 
to stake ten, 
            he immediately 
                      becomes aware 
of the possibility 
             of his being mistaken — 
a possibility which has hitherto 
              escaped 
                     his observation. 

The holding 
        of a thing 
               to be true is 
a phenomenon
          in our understanding 
which may rest on 
             objective grounds,

but requires, also, 
                subjective causes 
in the mind of the person 
                       judging. 

If a judgement is valid 
                    for every 
                           rational being, 
then its ground 
               is objectively sufficient, 
and it is termed 
                      a conviction. 

If, on the other hand, 
                   it has its ground in 
the particular character 
                     of the subject, 
     it is termed 
                      a persuasion.

Persuasion is a mere 
                         illusion, 
the ground of 
            the judgement, 
                   which lies solely 
in the subject, 
          being regarded 
                      as objective. 

Hence a judgement 
            of this kind 
            has only private validity — 
is only valid for 
           the individual 
                     who judges,

and the holding of 
              a thing to be true 
in this way 
            cannot be 
                     communicated.

“...the light of the sun, which shines upon a piece of wax, at the same time melts it, while it hardens clay”