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Finally, the notion that AI is not about "intelligence" is starting to percolate into the mainstream. Almost 10 years ago I argued that point but at the time it fell on deaf ears. Today, technology people still have this weird fascination with the idea that they could build "better" human minds or "improved" biological organisms, using novel hardware and software. It's a part of a greater psychological bias that prevents us from seeing the new, but with AI this mindset is particularly limiting.
...influential group of social and cognitive scientists say can help us better understand artificial intelligence. Today’s AI models are not, in their view, akin to a human mind. Rather, they’re a form of “cultural or social” technology that aggregates and passes on human knowledge — more like a printing press or even a bureaucracy or a market. If we want to understand how to manage AI, they say, we should study how we’ve handled new social technologies in the past.

Last year, Science published a version of this argument by Henry Farrell (a political scientist), Alison Gopnik (a psychologist), Cosma Shalizi (a statistician) and James Evans (a sociologist). “Beginning with language itself, human beings have had distinctive capacities to learn from the experiences of other humans and these capacities are arguably the secret of human evolutionary success,” the authors write. They go on to identify key ideas — from print to television to representative democracy — that transformed the nature of social learning by changing how societies process information.

The Science authors think we should view large language models along these lines — not as intelligence, but as a new form of cultural communication.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-09/what-s-the-best-way-to-think-of-ai-look-to-democracy-marketplaces
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Back to the Allison Gopnik interview, she makes two good points about a) school education in general and b) science education in particular:

I think it’s not a coincidence, for instance, that so many kids really want to do music and sports, even though we all say, “No, learn how to code. That’s the thing that will actually be helpful to you.” Because music and sports are among the few examples where we actually do this kind of apprenticeship. You do the thing, you get feedback, you try and do the thing again.

One of the things I say is, imagine if we tried to teach baseball the way that we teach science. How do we teach science? What we would do is, we would tell everybody about great baseball games when they were little. Maybe when they were in high school, they could throw the ball a lot to second base. When they were in college, they could reproduce great baseball plays, but they wouldn’t actually get to play the game until they were in graduate school. If you taught baseball that way, you wouldn’t think that people would be as good at baseball.
...
I think the current way that we do schooling is a good example of Goodhart’s law. We teach kids — because kids are so good at wanting to be skilled — we teach them how to be good at school, which we think is going to be correlated with the ability to do a wide range of things as an adult. Then it ends up being a separate kind of skill.


There's another interesting spot in the conversation where she discusses ADHD, and to me her thoughts rhyme with the Little Red Riding Hood (LRRH) story:
...we know and we just take for granted that little kids like two-year-olds — we say that they don’t pay attention, but what we really mean is that they don’t not pay attention. They’re paying attention to everything at once. That’s why two-year-olds are really distractible.

Then, as we get older, we get this more and more focused kind of attention. People vary in how much they end up within that state of focused attention. I think there’re lots of reasons to believe that an industrial schooled society really pushes people in the direction of having very focused attention. We really want people to have very focused attention.


In the LRRH story, the wolf initially takes advantage of the young girl because she's easily distractible. Ultimately, she overcomes her "distractibility" and develops focused attention skills, partially before and mostly after her resurrection, depending on the version. In essence, the fairy tale presents a recipe for modern education, which took off back in the Charles Perrault days. Is this a coincidence or confluence?
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"Every new theory of physics has invented a new concept of time"


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“Fairy tales are one-dimensional, depthless, abstract, and sparse; their characteristic manner is matter-of-fact—describing a wolf devouring a young girl, ordering a palace chef to cook a young woman, or chopping up a child to make blood pudding arouses no cry of protest or horror from the teller. “This is as it is, as it happened; the tale is as it is, no more no less.”

...

“The poet W. H. Auden, discussing these imaginary zones, adopted the term ‘Secondary World’, which had been used by Tolkien and C. S. Lewis, and declared, ‘Every normal human being is interested in two kinds of worlds: the Primary, everyday, world which he knows through his senses, and a Secondary world or worlds which he not only can create in his imagination, but also cannot stop himself creating … Stories about the Primary world may be called Feigned Histories; stories about a Secondary world myths or fairy tales.’ ”
...
“but whatever their atmosphere, they’re also laboratories for experiments with thought, allegories of alternatives to the world we know.”

-- Warner, Marina;. “Once upon a Time.”

===
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Philosophy can exclude nothing.

...before the work of systematization commences, there is a previous task—a very necessary task if we are to avoid the narrownesses inherent in all finite systems... [this] primary stage can be termed 'assemblage'.

...the philosophic process of assemblage should have received some attention from every educated mind, in its escape from its own specialism.

In Western Literature there are four great thinkers, whose services to civilized thought rest largely upon their achievements in philosophical assemblage; though each of them made important contributions to the structure of philosophic system. These men are Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and William James.
...
William James, essentially a modern man. His mind was adequately based upon the learning of the past. But the essence of his greatness was his marvellous sensitivity to the ideas of the present. He knew the world in which he lived, by travel, by personal relations with its leading men, by the variety of his own studies. He systematized; but above all he assembled. His intellectual life was one protest against the dismissal of experience in the interest of system. He had discovered intuitively the great truth with which modern logic is now wrestling.
...
One characteristic of the primary mode of conscious experience is its fusion of a large generality with an insistent particularity.
...
In order to acquire learning, we must first shake ourselves free of it. We must grasp the topic in the rough, before we smooth it out and shape it. For example, the mentality of John Stuart Mill was limited by his peculiar education which gave him system before any enjoyment of the relevant experience. Thus his systems were closed. We must be systematic; but we should keep our systems open. In other words, we should be sensitive to their limitations. There is always a vague 'beyond', waiting for penetration in respect to its detail.

--- Whitehead.
https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Whitehead/Whitehead_1938/1938_01.html
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The only intelligible doctrine of causation is founded on the doctrine of immanence. Each occasion presupposes the antecedent world as active in its own nature. This is the reason why events have a determinate status relatively to each other. Read more... )

-- AF Whitehead, Modes of Thought, Lecture 8.
https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Whitehead/Whitehead_1938/1938_08.html
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The sharp-cut scientific classifications are essential for scientific method. But they are dangerous for philosophy. Such classification hides the truth that the different modes of natural existence shade off into each other.

There is the animal life with its central direction of a society of cells, there is the vegetable life with its organized republic of cells, there is the cell life with its organized republic of molecules, there is the large-scale inorganic society of molecules with its passive acceptance of necessities derived from spatial relations, there is the infra-molecular activity which has lost all trace of the passivity of inorganic nature on a larger scale.

Whitehead. Modes of Thought, Chapter 8, Nature Alive. 1938.
https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Whitehead/Whitehead_1938/1938_08.html
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the characteristics of life are absolute self-enjoyment, creative activity, aim. Here 'aim' evidently involves the entertainment of the purely ideal so as to be directive of the creative process. Also the enjoyment belongs to the process and is not a characteristic of any static result. The aim is at the enjoyment belonging to the process.

...
It is nonsense to conceive of nature as a static fact, even for an instant devoid of duration. There is no nature apart from transition, and there is no transition apart from temporal duration. This is the reason why the notion of an instant of time, conceived as a primary simple fact, is nonsense.
Read more... )

Whitehead. Nature Alive, 1938. Lecture 8.
https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Whitehead/Whitehead_1938/1938_08.html
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In all discussions of nature we must remember the differences of scale, and in particular the differences of time-span. We are apt to take modes of observable functioning of the human body as setting an absolute scale. It is extremely rash to extend conclusions derived from observation far beyond the scale of magnitude to which observation was confined. For example, to exhibit apparent absence of change within a second of time tells nothing as to the change within a thousand years. Also no apparent change within a thousand years tells anything as to a million years; and no apparent change within a million years tells anything about a million million years. We can extend this progression indefinitely. There is no absolute standard of magnitude. Any term in this progression is large compared to its predecessor and is small compared to its successor.
...
The danger of all these fundamental notions is that we are apt to assume them unconsciously. When we ask ourselves any question we will usually find that we are assuming certain types of entities involved, that we are assuming certain modes of togetherness of these entities, and that we are even assuming certain widely spread generalities of pattern. Our attention is concerned with details of pattern, and measurement, and proportionate magnitude. Thus the laws of nature are merely all-pervading patterns of behaviour, of which the shift and discontinuance lie beyond our ken.
...
Nature is full-blooded. Real facts are happening. Physical Nature, as studied in Science, is to be looked upon as a complex of the more stable interrelations between the real facts of the real universe.


-- Whitehead. https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Whitehead/Whitehead_1938/1938_07.html

=========
pattern, measurement, proportional magnitude.
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The word ‘_perceive_’ is, in our common usage, shot through and through
with the notion of cognitive apprehension. So is the word
‘_apprehension_’, even with the adjective _cognitive_ omitted. I will
use the word ‘_prehension_’ for _uncognitive apprehension_: by this I
mean _apprehension_ which may or or may not be cognitive.

Whitehead. Science..., 1925.

----

If we modeled this prehension as a CT monad we could develop and algebra of prehension, with quantative thresholds that separate the uncognitive and cognitive.

https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/state+monad

X -> [W, WxY]

Here the operation [W, Wx(-)) is the monad on the type system which is induced by the above adjunction; and this latter function is naturally regarded as a morphism in the Kleisli category of this monad.
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The great characteristic of the mathematical mind is its capacity for
dealing with abstractions; and for eliciting from them clear-cut
demonstrative trains of reasoning, entirely satisfactory so long as it
is those abstractions which you want to think about. The enormous
success of the scientific abstractions, yielding on the one hand
_matter_ with its _simple location_ in space and time, and on the other
hand _mind_, perceiving, suffering, reasoning, but not interfering, has
foisted onto philosophy the task of accepting them as the most concrete
rendering of fact.

Thereby, modern philosophy has been ruined.

-- Whitehead. Science ..., 1925
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We need a private space station ASAP.
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Whitehead writes about "the scientific outburst of the seventeenth century."

By this rationalism [of the Middle Ages] I mean the belief that the avenue to truth was predominantly through a metaphysical analysis of the nature of things, which would thereby determine how things acted and functioned. The historical revolt was the definite abandonment of this method in favour of the study of the empirical facts of antecedents and consequences. In religion, it meant the appeal to the origins of Christianity; and in science it meant the appeal to experiment and the inductive method of reasoning.

Whitehead, Science ..., 1925


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Today was a strange day. One startup founder said that they made "one of the biggest discoveries in oncology." Another startup founder didn't say anything, which told us that they were going under in a couple of months or so. I guess I should be happy for the humanity at large.
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Apart from recurrence, knowledge would be impossible; for nothing could
be referred to our past experience. Also, apart from some regularity of
recurrence, measurement would be impossible. In our experience, as we
gain the idea of exactness, recurrence is fundamental.

Whitehead. Science ..., 1925
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Classification is a halfway house between the immediate concreteness of
the individual thing and the complete abstraction of mathematical
notions. The species take account of the specific character, and the
genera of the generic character. But in the procedure of relating
mathematical notions to the facts of nature, by counting, by
measurement, and by geometrical relations, and by types of order, the
rational contemplation is lifted from the incomplete abstractions
involved in definite species and genera, to the complete, abstractions
of mathematics. Classification is necessary. But unless you can progress
from classification to mathematics, your reasoning will not take you
very far.

The practical counsel to be derived from Pythagoras, is to measure, and thus
to express quality in terms of numerically determined quantity. But the
biological sciences, then and till our own time, have been
overwhelmingly classificatory. Accordingly, Aristotle by his Logic
throws the emphasis on classification. The popularity of Aristotelian
Logic retarded the advance of physical science throughout the Middle
Ages.

Whitehead. Science ..., 1925
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...thought can penetrate into every occasion of fact, so that by comprehending its key conditions, the whole complex of its pattern of conditions lies open before it.
...
Pythagoras was the first man who had any grasp of the full sweep of this general principle.
...
He asked, ‘What is the status of mathematical entities, such as numbers for example, in the realm of things?’ The number ‘two,’ for example, is in some sense exempt from the flux of time and the necessity of position in space. Yet it is involved in the real world. The same considerations apply to geometrical notions—to circular shape, for example.
...
unless you can progress from classification to mathematics, your reasoning will not take you very far.


Whitehead. Science in the modern world. 1925. Chapter II.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/68611/pg68611.txt
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Accordingly the full universe, disclosed for every variety of experience, is a universe in which every detail enters into its proper relationship with the immediate occasion. The generality of mathematics is the most complete generality consistent with the community of occasions which constitutes our metaphysical situation.

Whitehead. Science in the modern world, 1925.
https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/68611/pg68611.txt

This is a really deep point. Of all the sciences, math is the most internally consistent world: all the way from the most abstract generalizations down to humdrum elementary school arithmetics.

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