(no subject)
Oct. 6th, 2022 03:36 pmAI/ML divides reality differently than humans, i.e. it plays language games by completely different rules and fragmentation/synthesis levels.
valuing has a temporal dimension: to value X is normally to see reasons for trying to preserve or extend X over time.
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Valuing is a diachronic phenomenon in the sense that, in valuing something, one does not merely manifest an occurrent preference about how things go in the future. Instead, one acquires a stake in how things go, in whether what one values is realized or achieved or sustained. This is partly a consequence of the fact that valuing any X involves seeing oneself as having X-related reasons for action that extend over time and whose content depends on how X itself fares. And it is partly a consequence of the fact that valuing a thing also involves being emotionally vulnerable to how X fares. When we value something, then, we project ourselves into the future and invest ourselves in that future.
...valuing is both risky and proprietary. It is risky because, in valuing, we give hostages to fortune.
And it is proprietary because, in valuing, we lay claim to the future—we arrogate to ourselves the authority to make judgments about how the future should unfold. In a sense, valuing is a way of trying to control time. It is an attempt to impose a set of standards on time and to make it answerable to us. To value something is to resist the transitoriness of time; it is to insist that the passage of time lacks normative authority. Things may come and things may go, but we decide what matters.
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The fact that valuing is a diachronic phenomenon also enables it to play a stabilizing role in our lives
--- Samuel Scheiffler, Death and Afterlife.
He [Wittgenstein] does not mean by this that the doubt in question is spurious or deceitful, only that it is not real doubt – it is not what we mean by doubt. We doubt when we have reason to doubt, not because we are at leisure to doubt: ‘The question is this: how is doubt introduced into the language-game? One doubts on specific grounds’ (OC 458). Moreover, the philosophical sceptic’s doubt purports to be obsessive or radical: from the fact that we sometimes have reason to doubt, he concludes that we are always entitled to doubt. It is, again, precisely in this that the sceptic’s doubt is not real doubt: ‘A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt’ (OC 450); ‘If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty’ (OC 115).
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According to Wittgenstein, the sceptic is making two grave mistakes – and these are connected. One, we have just seen, is that he is mistaking the behaviour of doubt for genuine doubt; and the other is that he is mistaking hinges for propositions (either empirical or epistemic).
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty.
...the central questions he wishes to ask about the use of language. Do not look for 'entities' and 'facts' corresponding to numerical assertions, but look at the circumstances under which utterances involving numerals are made, and the utility of making them under these circumstances.
-- Saul Kripke, "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. (1984).
Although in detail the Tractatus is among the most difficult of philosophical works, its rough outlines are well known. To each sentence there corresponds a (possible) fact. If such a fact, obtains, the sentence is true; if not, false. For atomic sentences, the relation between a sentence and the fact it alleges is one of a simple correspondence or isomorphism. The sentence contains names, corresponding to objects. An
atomic sentence is itself a fact, putting the names in a certain relation; and it says that (there is a corresponding fact that) the corresponding objects are in the same relation. Other sentences are (finite or infinite) truth-functions of these.
-- Saul Kripke, "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. (1984).