(no subject)

[timelets]

He [Wittgenstein] does not mean by this that the doubt in question is spurious or deceitful, only that it is not real doubt – it is not what we mean by doubt. We doubt when we have reason to doubt, not because we are at leisure to doubt: ‘The question is this: how is doubt introduced into the language-game? One doubts on specific grounds’ (OC 458). Moreover, the philosophical sceptic’s doubt purports to be obsessive or radical: from the fact that we sometimes have reason to doubt, he concludes that we are always entitled to doubt. It is, again, precisely in this that the sceptic’s doubt is not real doubt: ‘A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt’ (OC 450); ‘If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty’ (OC 115).
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According to Wittgenstein, the sceptic is making two grave mistakes – and these are connected. One, we have just seen, is that he is mistaking the behaviour of doubt for genuine doubt; and the other is that he is mistaking hinges for propositions (either empirical or epistemic).

Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty.

Reasoned vs at leisure doubt is a key distinction that emerges from OC.