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Jul. 1st, 2022 04:48 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
timeletsSpace and time are a frame, an ordering realm, with the help of which we
establish and indicate the place and time point of the
particular things. It might be, therefore, that each thing,
if it is determined with respect to place and time, is now
just this (je dieses ), not mistakable for any other.
-- Heidegger, What is a thing?. 1967.
Through its particular space and time point , each
thing is unmistakably this one and not another. However,
some doubts arise as to whether with such a reference to
space and time we are saying anything about the thing
itself.
...
In grammar such words as '' this" and " that' ' are called
demonstratives, for these words demonstrate, they point
at.
...
There is no
information about the thingness of the thing without
knowledge of the kind of truth in which the thing stands.
...
We also can, further more, stick to
what we find "natural," that is , something with which one thinks no further.
We can take this thoughtlessness as a standard for the things .
...
Therefore, we do not ask about opinions, viewpoints,
and propositio.ns \.vhich appeared in e arlier times about
the thing in order to arrange them one after another, as in
a mu se um of weapons where the javelins are ordered by
particular centuri es. We do not ask at a ll about tl1 e for-
mula and the definition of the essence of the thing . Th ese
formulas are only the residuum an d se diment of ba s ic po -
sitions taken by his torical being (Da se in), toward, and in
th e 1nid st of, things taken as a whole, and which it took it-
se lf.
...
We h eard that in th e
time of Plat o and Aris totle th e definition of the thing was
set for th as the bearer of prop er ti es .
...
Wh a t ha s b ee n said a bo ut the hi s tor ica l c harac ter of th e
qu esti on " What is a th ing? " is valid for every p hil osop hi-
ca l qu es t io n \.vhich we pu t today or in the fu tu re, assum-
ing, o f cou rse , th a t p hil osop h y is a qu es ti oning th a t put s
itself in q u es tion a nd is therefore alway s a nd ever yw here
mo v ing in a ci rc le.
...
The an s\ver to t he qt1 es tion
"What is a thin g?" is diff ere nt in ch arac ter. It is not a
prop os ition bu t a t ran sformed b as ic position or, be tt er
still and m or e cautiously, the ini tia l t rans fo rma tion of the
hithe rt o exis ting posit ion tow a rd t hings, a.ch ange of q·ues-
tioning an d cva lt1 ation, of s i11 g a nd d ec id ing; in sh o rt , of
tl1 e (D a·sein ) in th e mid t of wh at is (inmitten
des Seienden.). To dete rmin e th ch anging b as ic p osi tion
within the re lat ion to what is, th at is th e tas k of an e ntir e
hist or ical period.
...
3. Summary
We now s ummarize in order to arrive at th e final
delineation of our intention. It wa s emp ha sized at the out-
set th at in philosophy, in contras t to the sciences, an
imm edia te a pproach to the questions is never possible. It
necessarily always re quires an introduction.
...
irst , wi th reg ar d to what is in ques ti on- th e thing-
with a n a dm it te dl y very po or lig ht we have sea rched the
horizon in which, ac or din g to t ra diti on, the thing and the
dete rm ination of its thingness sta nd . We reached a doubl e
result: first, the fra n1e of th e thing, tim e- sp ace, and the
thing's \vay of en cou nte rin g, th e "this," and then th e
structure of the thing itself as being th e be ar er of prop-
erties, entirely general and en1pty: to form the one for a
many
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5577cb2ae4b049f9488d4c04/t/5637e14fe4b07fb2f7b9a6e6/1446502735298/heidegger_1967.pdf
establish and indicate the place and time point of the
particular things. It might be, therefore, that each thing,
if it is determined with respect to place and time, is now
just this (je dieses ), not mistakable for any other.
-- Heidegger, What is a thing?. 1967.
Through its particular space and time point , each
thing is unmistakably this one and not another. However,
some doubts arise as to whether with such a reference to
space and time we are saying anything about the thing
itself.
...
In grammar such words as '' this" and " that' ' are called
demonstratives, for these words demonstrate, they point
at.
...
There is no
information about the thingness of the thing without
knowledge of the kind of truth in which the thing stands.
...
We also can, further more, stick to
what we find "natural," that is , something with which one thinks no further.
We can take this thoughtlessness as a standard for the things .
...
Therefore, we do not ask about opinions, viewpoints,
and propositio.ns \.vhich appeared in e arlier times about
the thing in order to arrange them one after another, as in
a mu se um of weapons where the javelins are ordered by
particular centuri es. We do not ask at a ll about tl1 e for-
mula and the definition of the essence of the thing . Th ese
formulas are only the residuum an d se diment of ba s ic po -
sitions taken by his torical being (Da se in), toward, and in
th e 1nid st of, things taken as a whole, and which it took it-
se lf.
...
We h eard that in th e
time of Plat o and Aris totle th e definition of the thing was
set for th as the bearer of prop er ti es .
...
Wh a t ha s b ee n said a bo ut the hi s tor ica l c harac ter of th e
qu esti on " What is a th ing? " is valid for every p hil osop hi-
ca l qu es t io n \.vhich we pu t today or in the fu tu re, assum-
ing, o f cou rse , th a t p hil osop h y is a qu es ti oning th a t put s
itself in q u es tion a nd is therefore alway s a nd ever yw here
mo v ing in a ci rc le.
...
The an s\ver to t he qt1 es tion
"What is a thin g?" is diff ere nt in ch arac ter. It is not a
prop os ition bu t a t ran sformed b as ic position or, be tt er
still and m or e cautiously, the ini tia l t rans fo rma tion of the
hithe rt o exis ting posit ion tow a rd t hings, a.ch ange of q·ues-
tioning an d cva lt1 ation, of s i11 g a nd d ec id ing; in sh o rt , of
tl1 e (D a·sein ) in th e mid t of wh at is (inmitten
des Seienden.). To dete rmin e th ch anging b as ic p osi tion
within the re lat ion to what is, th at is th e tas k of an e ntir e
hist or ical period.
...
3. Summary
We now s ummarize in order to arrive at th e final
delineation of our intention. It wa s emp ha sized at the out-
set th at in philosophy, in contras t to the sciences, an
imm edia te a pproach to the questions is never possible. It
necessarily always re quires an introduction.
...
irst , wi th reg ar d to what is in ques ti on- th e thing-
with a n a dm it te dl y very po or lig ht we have sea rched the
horizon in which, ac or din g to t ra diti on, the thing and the
dete rm ination of its thingness sta nd . We reached a doubl e
result: first, the fra n1e of th e thing, tim e- sp ace, and the
thing's \vay of en cou nte rin g, th e "this," and then th e
structure of the thing itself as being th e be ar er of prop-
erties, entirely general and en1pty: to form the one for a
many
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5577cb2ae4b049f9488d4c04/t/5637e14fe4b07fb2f7b9a6e6/1446502735298/heidegger_1967.pdf
