I think for Wittgenstein "understanding" doesn't have a meaning because it doesn't refer to a thing or specific activity. When somebody says "I understand" it means nothing until the person start participating in a particular language game. For example, when we ask somebody, "Do you understand X?", we mean "Are you ready to play?"
Searle does have a theory of mental states, which relates to intentionality. I think it's consistent with the Wittgenstein approach because it includes conditions of satisfaction, i.e. a success criteria within a particular language-game. Also, his Chinese Room argument shows that asking a computer "Do you understand?" is meaningless.
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Date: 2017-02-09 05:34 pm (UTC)Searle does have a theory of mental states, which relates to intentionality. I think it's consistent with the Wittgenstein approach because it includes conditions of satisfaction, i.e. a success criteria within a particular language-game. Also, his Chinese Room argument shows that asking a computer "Do you understand?" is meaningless.