Is it rational to believe in fair trials?
Jul. 31st, 2015 12:38 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
timeletsLet's say there's a country A where the government makes sure that fair trails don't exist. As a result, the majority of citizens don't believe in existence of fair trials. A minority of citizens that demands creation of fair trails is persecuted, confirming the non-existence of fair trials. Neither the society as a whole, nor individual citizens invest into an infrastructure for conducting fair trails. The marginal cost of fair trials is high.
Let's say there's a country B where the government makes sure that fair trials do exist. As a result, the government and a majority of citizens invest in developing and maintaining an infrastructure for fair trials. A minority of citizens doesn't get fair trials. When such instance is detected, the situation is considered to be a deviation from the norm and measures are taken to extend fair trials to that minority. Since the infrastructure for fair trials already exists, the marginal cost of additional fair trials is low.
Consider a citizen of country A who commits a crime in country B.
1. Would it be rational for the government of country A to prevent a fair trail for its citizen in country B?
2. Would it be rational for citizens of country A to believe that a fair trial in country B is impossible for the citizen of country A?
With regard to Question 1, if a fair trial for a citizen in country A is conducted in country B it increases demand for fair trails in country A. Introduction of fair trials in country A is expensive to the government and the society as a whole because the infrastructure for fair trials doesn't exist. Therefore, it is rational for the government of country A to prevent a fair trial of its citizen in country B.
(Note that we've already established that a fair trial for a citizen of country A in his/her own country is impossible. Therefore, extraditing the citizen doesn't increase his/here chance to get a fair trial).
With regard to Question 2, a belief in fair trials in country B for citizens of country A increases the probability that an individual citizen of country A will demand fair trials in his/her own country. This is an expensive strategy for the individual because it increases the chances for the individual of being persecuted. Unless the individual is threatened by an unfair trial, it is rational for him/her to believe that fair trials in country B don't exist.
Conclusion:
If the government of country A maintains for its citizens high information costs with regard country B and the level of persecution in country A is relatively low, citizens of country A will rationally believe that fair trials don't exist.
Let's say there's a country B where the government makes sure that fair trials do exist. As a result, the government and a majority of citizens invest in developing and maintaining an infrastructure for fair trials. A minority of citizens doesn't get fair trials. When such instance is detected, the situation is considered to be a deviation from the norm and measures are taken to extend fair trials to that minority. Since the infrastructure for fair trials already exists, the marginal cost of additional fair trials is low.
Consider a citizen of country A who commits a crime in country B.
1. Would it be rational for the government of country A to prevent a fair trail for its citizen in country B?
2. Would it be rational for citizens of country A to believe that a fair trial in country B is impossible for the citizen of country A?
With regard to Question 1, if a fair trial for a citizen in country A is conducted in country B it increases demand for fair trails in country A. Introduction of fair trials in country A is expensive to the government and the society as a whole because the infrastructure for fair trials doesn't exist. Therefore, it is rational for the government of country A to prevent a fair trial of its citizen in country B.
(Note that we've already established that a fair trial for a citizen of country A in his/her own country is impossible. Therefore, extraditing the citizen doesn't increase his/here chance to get a fair trial).
With regard to Question 2, a belief in fair trials in country B for citizens of country A increases the probability that an individual citizen of country A will demand fair trials in his/her own country. This is an expensive strategy for the individual because it increases the chances for the individual of being persecuted. Unless the individual is threatened by an unfair trial, it is rational for him/her to believe that fair trials in country B don't exist.
Conclusion:
If the government of country A maintains for its citizens high information costs with regard country B and the level of persecution in country A is relatively low, citizens of country A will rationally believe that fair trials don't exist.
