(no subject)
Jun. 22nd, 2015 10:25 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
timeletsLet's consider the claim "We don't know how to build a democracy in Russia" from an innovation perspective. In a simple model we should be able to identify two major components 1) cumulative investment; 2) learning curve. The "we don't know" claim relates to the latter. That is, it says that the democracy learning curve is particularly steep in Russia.
Now, instead of arguing about the learning curve, let's look at the direction of cumulative political investment: does it go into strengthening democratic institutions or not? Obviously, the investment is directed toward weakening of the institutions and strengthening Putin's autocratic rule. Therefore, the learning curve issue is simply irrelevant: there's nothing to learn.
A more relevant question would be how to slow down the slide into an entrenched autocracy. From this perspective, the opposition's participation in "hopeless" elections looks more rational because it attempts to preserve at least the possibility of voting for an independent candidate.
Need to think more about it.
Now, instead of arguing about the learning curve, let's look at the direction of cumulative political investment: does it go into strengthening democratic institutions or not? Obviously, the investment is directed toward weakening of the institutions and strengthening Putin's autocratic rule. Therefore, the learning curve issue is simply irrelevant: there's nothing to learn.
A more relevant question would be how to slow down the slide into an entrenched autocracy. From this perspective, the opposition's participation in "hopeless" elections looks more rational because it attempts to preserve at least the possibility of voting for an independent candidate.
Need to think more about it.
