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Mar. 30th, 2015 12:40 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
timeletsJust a thought: if a tin-pot dictator in the Wintrobe model frames payments for loyalty as shares, he can reduce loyalty and repression costs because citizens would have a strong incentive to identify with the dictator. For example, slogan "Крым Наш!" implies joint ownership, although real beneficiaries of the annexation are few and far in between. Moreover, the dictator can present the shares as having infinite value ("сакральные скрепы"), which should justify temporary sacrifices required from the current generation of loyalists.
At the same time, the dictator should suppress any attempts to re-frame the payment, especially when it turns negative, by eliminating other share-givers and the market for "loyalty shares" in general.
upd: need to consider the liquidity aspect of "loyalty shares and options" in a democracy vs dictatorship. In a democracy with regular contested elections, "loyalty options" have a set expiration date. For example, "investing in Obama" makes little sense by the second year of his second presidential term. That is, the longer the president serves, the lower the price for the options. On the other hand, "investing" in a dictator has the opposite effect.
At the same time, the dictator should suppress any attempts to re-frame the payment, especially when it turns negative, by eliminating other share-givers and the market for "loyalty shares" in general.
upd: need to consider the liquidity aspect of "loyalty shares and options" in a democracy vs dictatorship. In a democracy with regular contested elections, "loyalty options" have a set expiration date. For example, "investing in Obama" makes little sense by the second year of his second presidential term. That is, the longer the president serves, the lower the price for the options. On the other hand, "investing" in a dictator has the opposite effect.
