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Jun. 7th, 2014 12:35 amculture-dependent institution development
1. creation of public goods depends on the level of trust between citizens;
1.1. with trust: poor citizens will pull resources and develop democratic institutions that provide for distributive justice;
1.1.1. long-term democratic development and prosperity.
1.2. with distrust: citizens will rely on a strong leader to extract taxes and produce public goods;
1.2.1. long-term authoritarian tradition; no democratic institutions;
1.2.1.1. if an authoritarian leader (and his clique) starts appropriating beyond his fare share, public good production stagnates.
consider technology as an importable public good with a delay. authoritarian rulers can attain public goods without major investments (knowledge is non-rival, non-excludable). incentives to leverage public goods into private goods, e.g. capitalism with free markets.
consider appropriability of non-military technology in an authoritarian society. if the society stays close to the donor, key institutions follow (Singapore, S.Korea). the more societies diverge, the lower appropriability (Peter the Great vs Holland).
consider implications of "не верь, не бойся, не проси" on public good creation and institution development (1.2.1).
1. creation of public goods depends on the level of trust between citizens;
1.1. with trust: poor citizens will pull resources and develop democratic institutions that provide for distributive justice;
1.1.1. long-term democratic development and prosperity.
1.2. with distrust: citizens will rely on a strong leader to extract taxes and produce public goods;
1.2.1. long-term authoritarian tradition; no democratic institutions;
1.2.1.1. if an authoritarian leader (and his clique) starts appropriating beyond his fare share, public good production stagnates.
consider technology as an importable public good with a delay. authoritarian rulers can attain public goods without major investments (knowledge is non-rival, non-excludable). incentives to leverage public goods into private goods, e.g. capitalism with free markets.
consider appropriability of non-military technology in an authoritarian society. if the society stays close to the donor, key institutions follow (Singapore, S.Korea). the more societies diverge, the lower appropriability (Peter the Great vs Holland).
consider implications of "не верь, не бойся, не проси" on public good creation and institution development (1.2.1).
