Why would that surprise you? Mexico was the most durable socialist dominant-party state for most of the 20th century. Not only was the Mexican Revolution at the time perceived as the main precursor for the Russian one (John Reed was not the only one to travel between the two countries documenting the goings on), but also the regime it created stayed in power effectively till the year 2000. And, of course, given that it ended in elections, rather than any sort of a revolt, there was never a hard break between the revolutionary state and the current Mexican polity. The labor protections are the integral part of it. BTW, you might also be surprised by the fact that Mexico has a well-developed, if rather intricate, system of publicly provided medical care historically linked to legal employment (though partially decoupled from it in recent years in order to make it near-universal).
The US these days, somewhat paradoxically, concentrates on union rights even more than on wages. It does play well with the union types north of the border, but even there things are less than straightforward. Mexico has historically had extremely strong unions, which also arose in the post-revolutionary period. But these unions for decades were very much part of the governing regime. To make it clear, they were not enslaved by it, as in the Soviet case, but an integral part of the effective ruling coalition (which the governing Institutional Revolutionary Party was). In fact, having been established in their classic shape back in the 1920s and 1930s they were quite agressive towards the original private sector employers and remained a force that the government had to very much reckon with even in the nationalised industries for decades thereafter and even today.
The problem, therefore, is not that Mexico does not have unions: they are still much stronger than in the US. The problem is that these unions frequently act not for the benefit of their rank-and-file, but for the benefit of their established leadership and/or of the related political interests. True, they are less powerful (or sometimes even non-existent) in newer manufacturing industries, but, in the end, they are very much present and receive substantial rent (whether it is shared with workers is another matteR).
What the labor reforms insisted on by the US have done is introduce greater democracy and competition into the unionization process. Whether these remain more than paper declarations is still to be seen. But, if anything, it is far from obvious that these things would make Mexican labor more expensive to the employer. They should (or, should I say, might) increase the share that the worker gets: but that share does not have to come from the employers. Many Mexican reformers have latched onto the US demands in order to obtain these reforms. This is, perhaps, one of the better consequences of the negotiation process.
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Date: 2019-12-16 07:22 pm (UTC)The US these days, somewhat paradoxically, concentrates on union rights even more than on wages. It does play well with the union types north of the border, but even there things are less than straightforward. Mexico has historically had extremely strong unions, which also arose in the post-revolutionary period. But these unions for decades were very much part of the governing regime. To make it clear, they were not enslaved by it, as in the Soviet case, but an integral part of the effective ruling coalition (which the governing Institutional Revolutionary Party was). In fact, having been established in their classic shape back in the 1920s and 1930s they were quite agressive towards the original private sector employers and remained a force that the government had to very much reckon with even in the nationalised industries for decades thereafter and even today.
The problem, therefore, is not that Mexico does not have unions: they are still much stronger than in the US. The problem is that these unions frequently act not for the benefit of their rank-and-file, but for the benefit of their established leadership and/or of the related political interests. True, they are less powerful (or sometimes even non-existent) in newer manufacturing industries, but, in the end, they are very much present and receive substantial rent (whether it is shared with workers is another matteR).
What the labor reforms insisted on by the US have done is introduce greater democracy and competition into the unionization process. Whether these remain more than paper declarations is still to be seen. But, if anything, it is far from obvious that these things would make Mexican labor more expensive to the employer. They should (or, should I say, might) increase the share that the worker gets: but that share does not have to come from the employers. Many Mexican reformers have latched onto the US demands in order to obtain these reforms. This is, perhaps, one of the better consequences of the negotiation process.