Преуменьшать поддержку Трампа среди военных не стоит.
Среди ныне служащих и ветеранов республиканцев и им сочувствующих традиционно больше, чем демократов, а среди республиканцев подавляющее большинство продолжает Трампа поддерживать несмотря ни на что - этот факт следует признавать, каким бы непонятным и неприятным он не был.
Almost half of those who responded to the poll said they do not affiliate with either major political party, continuing a trend in Military Times polls from recent years away from close ties to either Republicans or Democrats. Despite that, roughly 45 percent of troops polled said they intend to back Republican candidates, even though less than a third say they are registered with the party. Similarly, about 28 percent said they plan to vote for Democrats in the upcoming contests, even though only about one-fifth consider themselves members of that party. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/10/17/troops-see-rising-political-tension-in-the-ranks-poll-shows/
Но интересно, насколько политические пристрастия борются в них с профессиональной этикой. В этом смысле мнение бывших лидеров имеет ценность.
Mattis isn’t alone in respected military voices speaking out against Trump and his actions, joining former Joints Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen and Martin Dempsey, as well as retired Marine General John Allen. “The slide of the United States into illiberalism may well have begun on June 1, 2020. Remember the date. It may well signal the beginning of the end of the American experiment,” Allen writes. It’s hard to say we’re at an inflection point, because public opinion of Trump rarely changes — except at the margins. But these are significant breaks with a president who routinely finds himself fighting unpopular battles. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/mattis-other-military-leaders-close-ranks-against-trump-n1224661
В последнии дни президентства в 1974 Никсона министр обороны Шлезингер, нарушив субординацию, тайно распорядился без его одобрения не принимать военных приказов президента. Опасались в частности того, что Никсон откажется подчиниться закону и призовёт верные ему армейские части в Вашингтон.
As he told the acquaintance, "I had seen enough so that I was not going to run risks with the future of the United States. There are a lot of parliamentary governments that have been overthrown with much less at stake." Sometime in late July of 1974, Schlesinger called in Air Force General George S. Brown, the newly appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Brown was known as an officer who was far more comfortable behind the stick of an airplane than in an office; he never seemed to master high-level politics, with its subtle language and indirection. Bearing that in mind, and aware that Brown had taken an oath of office that made him responsible to Nixon as Commander-in-Chief, Schlesinger trod delicately during their talk. His goal was to express his concerns about the White House and somehow to get Brown to reach the same conclusion that he himself had already reached. In essence, Schlesinger asked Brown for a commitment that neither he nor any of the other chiefs would respond to an order from the White House calling for the use of military force without immediately informing Schlesinger. Brown dutifully relayed Schlesinger's message to the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a meeting a few hours later. He began the session, one of the joint chiefs recalls, by announcing, "I've just had the strangest conversation with the Secretary of Defense." Schlesinger had urged him not to "do anything to disturb the equilibrium of the Republic, and to make sure we're in accord." He had said, "Don't take any emergency-type action without consulting me." Brown was troubled by Schlesinger's remarks, and so was everyone else at the meeting. "We were confused, and George had to be confused," the chief says. 'We sat around looking at our fingernails; we didn't want to look at each other. It was a complete shock to us. I don't think any of us ever considered taking any action. We didn't know whether to be affronted or flattered at the thought." The chief recalls that one of his colleagues commented that Schlesinger must have been "thinking of something out of Seven Days in May." If there was any consensus, the chief says, it was that "Schlesinger was coming unglued." Schlesinger was clear, however, about his concerns. He continued to believe that Cushman, with his personal loyalty to Nixon, was a weak link in the new chain of command. He carried his own deliberations further and quietly investigated just which forces would be available to Nixon. He found out how quickly the 82nd Airborne Division could be brought to Washington from its home base at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Marines, he learned—Cushman's troops—were by far the strongest presence in the Washington area, with an honor-guard barracks in southeast Washington and a large officer-training facility at Quantico, Virginia, some thirty miles to the south. Schlesinger began to investigate what forces could be assembled at his order as a counterweight to the Marines, if Nixon—in a crisis—chose to subvert the Constitution. Schlesinger's overriding concern, in case a crisis did arise, was the possibility that the armed forces would follow their inherent loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief. One comfort was his firm belief, based on what he had seen in the previous five and a half years, that any such order, if given, would come not directly from Nixon but from Haig. The Joint Chiefs would respond to an order from the secretary of defense, Schlesinger believed, before they would respond to one from Haig. As he explained to the acquaintance, "If an order came from below the Commander-in-Chief level, I could handle it." https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1983/08/the-pardon/305571/
no subject
Среди ныне служащих и ветеранов республиканцев и им сочувствующих традиционно больше, чем демократов, а среди республиканцев подавляющее большинство продолжает Трампа поддерживать несмотря ни на что - этот факт следует признавать, каким бы непонятным и неприятным он не был.
Almost half of those who responded to the poll said they do not affiliate with either major political party, continuing a trend in Military Times polls from recent years away from close ties to either Republicans or Democrats.
Despite that, roughly 45 percent of troops polled said they intend to back Republican candidates, even though less than a third say they are registered with the party.
Similarly, about 28 percent said they plan to vote for Democrats in the upcoming contests, even though only about one-fifth consider themselves members of that party.
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/10/17/troops-see-rising-political-tension-in-the-ranks-poll-shows/
Но интересно, насколько политические пристрастия борются в них с профессиональной этикой. В этом смысле мнение бывших лидеров имеет ценность.
Mattis isn’t alone in respected military voices speaking out against Trump and his actions, joining former Joints Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen and Martin Dempsey, as well as retired Marine General John Allen.
“The slide of the United States into illiberalism may well have begun on June 1, 2020. Remember the date. It may well signal the beginning of the end of the American experiment,” Allen writes.
It’s hard to say we’re at an inflection point, because public opinion of Trump rarely changes — except at the margins.
But these are significant breaks with a president who routinely finds himself fighting unpopular battles.
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/mattis-other-military-leaders-close-ranks-against-trump-n1224661
В последнии дни президентства в 1974 Никсона министр обороны Шлезингер, нарушив субординацию, тайно распорядился без его одобрения не принимать военных приказов президента. Опасались в частности того, что Никсон откажется подчиниться закону и призовёт верные ему армейские части в Вашингтон.
As he told the acquaintance, "I had seen enough so that I was not going to run risks with the future of the United States. There are a lot of parliamentary governments that have been overthrown with much less at stake." Sometime in late July of 1974, Schlesinger called in Air Force General George S. Brown, the newly appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Brown was known as an officer who was far more comfortable behind the stick of an airplane than in an office; he never seemed to master high-level politics, with its subtle language and indirection. Bearing that in mind, and aware that Brown had taken an oath of office that made him responsible to Nixon as Commander-in-Chief, Schlesinger trod delicately during their talk. His goal was to express his concerns about the White House and somehow to get Brown to reach the same conclusion that he himself had already reached. In essence, Schlesinger asked Brown for a commitment that neither he nor any of the other chiefs would respond to an order from the White House calling for the use of military force without immediately informing Schlesinger. Brown dutifully relayed Schlesinger's message to the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a meeting a few hours later. He began the session, one of the joint chiefs recalls, by announcing, "I've just had the strangest conversation with the Secretary of Defense." Schlesinger had urged him not to "do anything to disturb the equilibrium of the Republic, and to make sure we're in accord." He had said, "Don't take any emergency-type action without consulting me." Brown was troubled by Schlesinger's remarks, and so was everyone else at the meeting. "We were confused, and George had to be confused," the chief says. 'We sat around looking at our fingernails; we didn't want to look at each other. It was a complete shock to us. I don't think any of us ever considered taking any action. We didn't know whether to be affronted or flattered at the thought." The chief recalls that one of his colleagues commented that Schlesinger must have been "thinking of something out of Seven Days in May." If there was any consensus, the chief says, it was that "Schlesinger was coming unglued."
Schlesinger was clear, however, about his concerns. He continued to believe that Cushman, with his personal loyalty to Nixon, was a weak link in the new chain of command. He carried his own deliberations further and quietly investigated just which forces would be available to Nixon. He found out how quickly the 82nd Airborne Division could be brought to Washington from its home base at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Marines, he learned—Cushman's troops—were by far the strongest presence in the Washington area, with an honor-guard barracks in southeast Washington and a large officer-training facility at Quantico, Virginia, some thirty miles to the south. Schlesinger began to investigate what forces could be assembled at his order as a counterweight to the Marines, if Nixon—in a crisis—chose to subvert the Constitution. Schlesinger's overriding concern, in case a crisis did arise, was the possibility that the armed forces would follow their inherent loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief. One comfort was his firm belief, based on what he had seen in the previous five and a half years, that any such order, if given, would come not directly from Nixon but from Haig. The Joint Chiefs would respond to an order from the secretary of defense, Schlesinger believed, before they would respond to one from Haig. As he explained to the acquaintance, "If an order came from below the Commander-in-Chief level, I could handle it."
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1983/08/the-pardon/305571/
Не хотелось бы повторения.