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China is now positioning itself as the defender of Asian values, against Western imperialism and demagoguery. For example, https://theconversation.com/why-the-us-doesnt-understand-chinese-thought-and-must-81220
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this duality is cast as “facticity” and “transcendence.” The “givens” of our situation such as our language, our environment, our previous choices and our very selves in their function as in-itself constitute our facticity. As conscious individuals, we transcend (surpass) this facticity in what constitutes our “situation.” In other words, we are always beings “in situation,” but the precise mixture of transcendence and facticity that forms any situation remains indeterminable, at least while we are engaged in it. Hence Sartre concludes that we are always “more” than our situation and that this is the ontological foundation of our freedom. We are “condemned” to be free, in his hyperbolic phrase.

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the unsuitability of the human cortex for philosophical work. On this view, our most celebrated philosophers are like dogs walking on their hind legs—just barely attaining the threshold level of performance required for engag- ing in the activity at all.

--- Nick Bostrom. Superinteligence, 2014. p 59.
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According to William James, there are two kinds of philosophers: tender-minded and tough-minded.
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Сегодня читал про полемику Камю и Сартра в 1952 году, заодно и о смысле/бессмысленности жизни в их философских системах. Они оба экзистенциалисты existential philosophers, вопрос ради чего жить там чуть ли ни самый главный. Например, у Камю вопрос "Почему бы не покончить самоубийством?" - основной вопрос всей философии. Интересно и нетривиально.

Потом залез в dreamwidth, побродил по чужим френдлентам. Наткнулся на воспоминания какой-то известной женщины. Она пишет об особенно трудном периоде своей жизни: Я решила, что должна жить ради сына.

Вот и весь экзистенциализм.
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...to any willing there belongs something willed, which has already made itself definite in terms of a "for-the-sake-of-which". If willing is to be possible ontologically, the following items are constitutive for it:
(I) the prior disclosedness of the "for-the-sake-of-which" in general (Being-ahead-of- itself);
(2) the disclosedness of something with which one can concern oneself (the world as the "wherein" of Being-already);
(3) Dasein's projection of itself understandingly upon a potentiality-for-Being towards a possibility of the entity 'willed'.

In the phenomenon of willing, the underlying totality of care shows through.
The average everydayness of concern becomes blind to its possibilities, and tranquillizes itself with that which is merely 'actual'. This tranquillizing does not rule out a high degree of diligence in one's concern, but arouses it. In this case no positive new possibilities are willed, but that which is at one's disposal becomes 'tactically' altered in such a way that there is a semblance of something happening.

this tranquillized 'willing' under the guidance of the "they", does not signify that one's Being towards one's potentiality-for- Being has been extinguished, but only that it has been modified. In such a case, one's Being towards possibilities shows itself for the most part as mere wishing.

--- Martin Heidegger. Being and Time.

The latter is what the fashion industry is all about.
upd. also note the important distinction b/w willing and wishing.
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The only genuine access to them (entities) lies in knowing [Erkennen], intellectio, in the sense of the kind of knowledge [Erkenntnis] we get in mathematics and physics. Mathematical knowledge is regarded by Descartes as the one manner of apprehending entities which can always give assurance that their Being has been securely grasped. If anything measures up in its own kind of Being to the Being that is accessible in mathematical knowledge, then it is in the authentic sense.
That which enduringly remains, really is. This is the sort of thing which mathematics knows.
his ontology of the world is not primarily determined by his leaning towards mathematics, a science which he chances to esteem very highly, but rather by his ontological orientation in principle towards Being as constant presence-at-hand, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp.

--- Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, p. 96.
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A child has hurt himself and he cries; then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour.
“So you are saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying?” On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying, it does not describe it.

-- L.Wittgenstein. Investigations

Interesting. The implication being that we replace emotional reactions with words. Then we mix emotion-expressions with, e.g. reason-expressions, and the world becomes a hodgepodge of expressions other people have to untangle in order to understand what we are referring to.

A - a person experiencing pain, including psych.
B - a set of statements the person makes to replace crying
C - a set of statements the person makes to explain reasons for not crying

f: A -> B
g: A -> C

D - a set of statements another person hears while observing the first person.

g': B -> D
f': C -> D

D is a pushout. How would these two understand each other?
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The problem with philosophy, however, was that nobody seemed to agree on anything, and different schools bickered endlessly; the medical world was equally divided into sects, whose exponents debated about causes of diseases, appropriate cures and just about anything else. Looking for some certainty and (like Ptolemy and like many philosophers of this period) for a criterion to distinguish truth from falsity, Galen came to admire the rigour of mathematical proofs, and the consensus they engendered among geometers, arithmeticians and astronomers.

-- S.Cuomo. Ancient Math.

Philosophy seems to be a fundamentally divergent technique for exploring concepts and events. It doesn't have an objective "stop" condition, like math or bargaining. A couple of weeks ago, our Wittgenstein professor briefly discussed the issue of "When to stop explaining to a child why the sky is blue." Ultimately, it boils down to "I don't know" or "I'll tell you more when you grow up and learn more physics."
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Just for once, don’t think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all! For that is the way of talking which confuses you. Instead, ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say “Now I know how to go on”?

Denk doch einmal gar nicht an das Verstehen als ‘seelischen Vorgang’! a Denn das ist die Redeweise, die dich verwirrt. Sondern frage dich: in was für einem Fall, unter was für Umständen sagen wir denn “Jetzt weiß ich weiter”?

-- Wittgenstein. Investigations.
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89. For logic seemed to have a peculiar depth — a universal significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the foundation of all the sciences. For logical investigation explores the essence of all things. It seeks to see to the foundation of things, and shouldn’t concern itself whether things actually happen in this or that way. —– It arises neither from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp causal connections, but from an urge to understand the foundations, or essence, of everything empirical.

Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, essential to our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand.

- L.W. Phil. Inv. 4th ed. p. 46-47.
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47. But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed? What are the simple constituent parts of a chair? The pieces of wood from which it is assembled? Or the molecules, or the atoms? “Simple” means: not composite. And here the point is: in what sense ‘composite’? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the ‘simple parts of a chair’.

Asking “Is this object composite?” outside a particular game is like what a boy once did when he had to say whether the verbs in certain sentences were in the active or passive voice, and who racked his brains over the question whether the verb “to sleep”, for example, meant something active or passive.

-- Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. 4ed. p 26
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15.... When philosophizing, it will often prove useful to say to ourselves: naming something is rather like attaching a name tag to a thing.

Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed.
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4.112 The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.

Philosophy is not a theory but an activity.
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.

4.116 Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly.
Everything that can be said can be said clearly.

--- Wittgenstein. Tractatus.
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There are various problems as regards language. First, there is the problem what actually occurs in our minds when we use language with the intention of meaning something by it; this problem belongs to psychology. Secondly, there is the problem as to what is the relation subsisting between thoughts, words, or sentences, and that which they refer to or mean; this problem belongs to epistemology. Thirdly, there is the problem of using sentences so as to convey truth rather than falsehood; this belongs to the special sciences dealing with the subject-matter of the sentences in question. Fourthly, there is the question: what relation must one fact (such as a sentence) have to another in order to be capable of being a symbol for that other? This last is a logical question, and is the one with which Mr Wittgenstein is concerned.
--- Bertrand Russel. Introduction to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, by Ludwig Witgentstein. 1922.
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I was always suspicious of analogies because I knew that any two objects could be grouped together for whatever reason. But I never bothered to find a logical proof of that. Well, here's how Peirce does it in just one paragraph for any group of objects*,

This principle is that any plurality or lot of objects whatever have some character in common (no matter how insignificant) which is peculiar to them and not shared by anything else. The word "character" here is taken in such a sense as to include negative characters, such as incivility, inequality, etc., as well as their positives, civility, equality, etc. To prove the theorem, I will show what character any two things, A and B, have in common, not shared by anything else. The things, A and B, are each distinguished from all other things by the possession of certain characters which may be named A-ness and B-ness. Corresponding to these positive characters, are the negative characters un-A-ness, which is possessed by everything except A, and un-B-ness, which is possessed by everything except B. These two characters are united in everything except A and B; and this union of the characters un-A-ness and un-B-ness makes a compound character which may be termed A-B-lessness. This is not possessed by either A or B, but it is possessed by everything else. This character, like every other, has its corresponding negative un-A-B-lessness, and this last is the character possessed by both A and B, and by nothing else. It is obvious that what has thus been shown true of two things is, mutatis mutandis, true of any number of things. Q. E. D.
In any world whatever, then, there must be a character peculiar to each possible group of objects.

He gives his proof in a free text form because the modern notation for propositional logic has not been invented yet. In any case, in a true Pragmatist fashion he doesn't stop with the proof, but goes further,

so long as we regard characters abstractly, without regard to their relative importance, etc., there is no possibility of a more or less degree of orderliness in the world, the whole system of relationship between the different characters being given by mere logic; that is, being implied in those facts which are tacitly admitted as soon as we admit that there is any such thing as reasoning.

In other words, unless we have a system of value judgments that enables us to make decisions about relative importance, the logic itself can't settle issues.

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The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief. ... as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false.
- Charles S. Peirce.


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